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with NATO membership, but its supporters would at least in principle welcome 
institutions that might be able to pick up the slack as they orchestrate the retrac-
tion of America’s geopolitical commitments.
Nonetheless, the policies pursued by conservatives are likely to do more 
harm than good to the Atlantic partnership. Europeans have little stomach for 
the brash unilateralism favored by neoconservatives. Nor do they deem wise 
calls from the right for NATO to offer membership to Georgia and Ukraine, a 
move that would provoke Russia and saddle the alliance with new and onerous 
commitments. As for the Tea Party, mainstream conservatives in Europe do not 
relate to either the isolationism or the social and fiscal conservatism of America’s 
far right. Simply put, an America that plays by conservative rules abroad and 
at home is not an appealing partner for Europe. American progressives are the 
natural political allies of Europeans and would therefore provide the Atlantic 
community a much firmer foundation of affinity and interest.
Progressive leadership at home is essential to the nation’s political and eco-
nomic renewal, which in turn is the foundation for progressive leadership abroad. 
Since World War II, the United States has been dramatically successful in making 
the globe more stable, prosperous, and liberal. The recipe for ongoing success 
in this mission is no different than in the past: a solvent and centrist America 
reliant on a progressive combination of power and partnership to safeguard the 
national interest while improving the world. d
Democracy Promotion: Done Right,  
A Progressive Cause
Rosa Brooks
 By the beginning of the Obama Administration, democracy promotion had become a rather tarnished idea, and understandably so. Like Islam or Christianity, much blood has been shed beneath its banner. It may be 
true that democracies don’t go to war with one another, but they certainly go to 
war, and their wars kill people just as dead as the wars undertaken by illiberal 
regimes. Anyone on the political left can tell the story: During the Cold War, the 
United States fought endless proxy wars and engaged in a great deal of overt 
and covert mischief, all in the name of democracy. During the Bush Administra-
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tion, the idea of democracy promotion became tightly and inexorably bound up 
with regime change and the carnage of the Iraq War. Because it came to us in a 
package that included bloodshed, occupation, torture, and indefinite detentions, 
Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” left a bitter taste in the mouth. 
Little wonder, then, that by 2009 many progressives considered democracy 
promotion something most appropriately tossed into the dustbin of history. At 
best, it seemed like a decent concept that had become permanently tainted by 
the instrumentalism and abuses of the Bush era. At worst, it seemed inherently 
flawed, a neoconservative idea premised on the worst sort of American arro-
gance and hubris. Democracy promotion, in this view, was but a siren call to the 
naïve, one that would only lead the United States into bloody, destructive, and 
expensive foreign adventures.
The Obama Administration consequently viewed democracy promotion with 
caution and, in some quarters, with mild distaste. While the word “democracy” 
could hardly be banned in the world’s oldest and proudest democracy, key Admin-
istration spokespeople were careful to avoid placing any great weight on it. Was 
democracy a fine thing? To be sure. Was the U.S. government determined to pro-
mote it, foster it, build it, or demand it, in Afghanistan or elsewhere? Heavens, no. 
I recall, for instance, a great to-do when a senior Defense Department offi-
cial testified before Congress in 2010 that one of our goals in Afghanistan was 
to “foster transparent, effective and accountable democratic governance.” I 
was responsible, having fecklessly inserted the phrase into the draft testimony, 
where it remained unnoticed during subsequent reviews. When discovered 
after the testimony was delivered, it brought the wrath of the White House 
down on us all: We were not, under any circumstances, to suggest in any way 
that promoting democracy was a goal of the Obama Administration. In the 
new realism of 2009 and 2010, democracy promotion appeared (officially, at 
least) to be anathema.
But a funny thing happened on the way to history’s dustbin. The Arab world 
woke up. In Tunisia, then Egypt, then Bahrain, Libya, and Syria, crowds of pro-
testers took to the streets to speak out against autocracy and repression—and 
amidst the cacophony, “Democracy!” became a powerful rallying cry. 
Taken by surprise, the Obama Administration backpedaled rapidly, insisting 
that the United States’ support for democracy abroad had been unwavering. 
“It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, 
and to support transitions to democracy,” declared President Obama on May 19. 
But even with this new surge of rhetorical support for democracy, the 
Administration remained cautious. The White House response to events in the 
region seemed always a beat behind, and while we sent fighter jets to Libya, we 
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contented ourselves with handwringing over Bahrain and Syria. In the Middle 
East, much of the early euphoria turned to disappointment.
DemoCRACy: A HUmAn FAiL-sAFe
The events of the last year make this as good a time as any to ask ourselves (again) 
what place democracy promotion should have in our foreign policy. Can democ-
racy promotion be saved, in the face of all our mistakes, all our inconsistencies, 
all our false starts, hypocrisies, and hesitations? 
I think the answer is yes. Democracy promotion should remain a vital part 
of our foreign policy—not despite our mistakes, inconsistencies, false starts, 
hypocrisies, and hesitations, but because of them. We should embrace and pro-
mote democracy not because it is perfect or because we are perfect, but because 
democracy remains the only political system yet devised that builds in a capac-
ity for self-correction.
Start by going back to first principles. Democracy is premised on an idea that 
remains radical in many parts of the world: the idea that every human being 
counts, that we all have a right to participate in making the decisions that will 
affect us, that no person or group has a permanent monopoly on political wisdom. 
Political theorists can debate whether civil and human rights require democracy 
to protect them or whether democracies must protect civil and human rights in 
order to sustain themselves. For our purposes, it is probably enough to say that 
the idea of democracy carries with it at least some minimal assumptions about 
rights and the rule of law: Democracy cannot thrive without at least some degree 
of freedom of expression and assembly, and it requires at least some minimal 
institutional arrangements to sustain it (courts, legislatures, and so on). How 
much free expression (or judicial independence, or parliamentary power) is 
“enough” is hard to say; certainly, reasonably stable and contented democracies 
have answered this question in different ways. 
But the basic contours of the idea remain both clear and sound. If everyone 
counts, then everyone must be allowed to speak and organize and assemble with 
others; everyone must have a shot at arguing with and persuading others. This 
is how ideas emerge, struggle for life, gain prominence, and are tested. Some 
survive; some vanish; some fade for a time and re-emerge again later on. 
Democracy is a vision of governance that rests equally upon the conviction 
that worthy ideas can come from anyone, and upon the conviction that humans 
are inherently fallible. Pernicious ideas can also come from anyone, and there 
will be times when pernicious ideas will dominate our politics and our policies. 
We will get things wrong, repeatedly. And this is why we need democracy. Only 
if we build into our political systems a capacity for change and self-correction, 
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a capacity for new ideas to emerge and old ones to be rejected, can we hope to 
make it through the inevitably recurring dark periods.
This is why progressives should care about promoting democracy: not out 
of any triumphalist conviction that we (America, the West) are the best of the 
best, but rather out of humility. We—and our American democracy—are mani-
festly imperfect. We more or less wiped out our continent’s indigenous popula-
tion and marginalized the survivors. We enslaved millions of our fellow human 
beings, denied women the right to hold property and vote, and withheld basic 
civil rights from African Americans. 
We have made progress, but it has been slow and uneven, and as a nation we’re 
hardly out of the woods. We incarcerate a higher percentage of our population 
than any other country, and felony disenfranchisement laws continue to deny the 
vote to millions of mostly black men. 
We have not yet found a way to solve 
the problem of money in politics; as 
wealth inequalities grow, we increas-
ingly inhabit a democracy in which 
some are distinctly more equal than 
others. Here, ironically, our own free-
expression doctrines have come back 
to bite us; in 2010, the Supreme Court 
ruled that limits on corporate campaign spending amount to infringements on 
the free-expression rights of corporations. 
Our democracy remains deeply flawed, and continues to produce bad poli-
cies with impressive regularity. The Bush Administration’s pursuit of democracy 
through military force was one of those bad ideas our democracy managed to pro-
duce. Our (thankfully brief ) official embrace of torture was another. Our democ-
racy enabled all of it—but our democracy also ultimately enabled its repudiation. 
Democracy, after all, has allowed us to change our Constitution repeatedly 
over time to create a more inclusive polity. Democracy has enabled and empow-
ered political extremism, but it has also allowed us to protect moderates and 
minorities. Democracy let us start foolish wars, but it also let us elect leaders 
capable of stopping them. 
In this sense, democracy is an inevitable concomitant to a belief in human 
fallibility. And it is on this basis that progressives should champion democracy: 
because democracy is the only form of governance to enshrine the capacity 
for self-correction, debate, and argument. Democracy is what lets us struggle 
through our mistakes and learn. Democracy is no guarantor of wise political 
decision-making, but lack of democracy correlates with stagnation and conflict. 
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There is ample empirical evidence for this claim: Democracies are far more likely 
than autocracies or failed states to be prosperous, stable, and safe. Democracies 
form the backbone of the international institutions that, while imperfect, have 
helped minimize and manage conflict since World War II. Democracies produce 
and export far fewer violent extremists than repressive societies.
This understanding of democracy suggests that promoting democracy abroad 
can be both principled and pragmatic. Democracy is a human fail-safe. Things can 
go badly wrong in democracies, but it is hard for them to go badly wrong forever. 
A HUmbLeR, moRe PAtient PoweR
This approach to democracy promotion is the polar opposite of Bush-era tri-
umphalism, and it has certain practical corollaries. If we support democracy 
because we’re imperfect, it follows that the project of promoting democracy 
abroad needs to be undertaken with honesty, humility, patience, and realism. 
Honesty involves acknowledging our own past mistakes and hypocrisies, and 
admitting that we will make new mistakes in the future. Humility is related—we 
still have not solved all our problems here at home, and it would indeed be hubris-
tic to imagine that we can solve someone else’s problems with speed or ease. 
This point has been made before by many thoughtful commentators, but it 
bears additional repetition. To put it bluntly, when it comes to fostering democ-
racy abroad, we really don’t know what we’re doing much of the time. What sort 
of democracy is best? What sort of electoral and party system? What checks and 
balances? What rights, for whom, how understood? What role does support for 
civil society play, and how shall we identify and define “civil society”? What 
role do legal and judicial institutions play in buttressing nascent democracies? 
Can we create that most elusive thing of all, “political will”? How should these 
challenges be prioritized? We often offer an a-cultural, technocratic approach 
to these and a multitude of other issues, and yet we know remarkably little about 
what is useful and what is not. 
There is no one more thoughtful on these issues than Thomas Carothers of 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who concludes ruefully in his 
book, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, that “we are still largely 
groping in the semi-darkness, bumping into a lot of things, gradually discerning 
the outlines of the major pieces of furniture in the room, and hoping to do more 
good than harm.” I would add that we usually do most harm when we are most con-
vinced we are doing good. (Consider Latin America in the 1980s, or Iraq in 2003.)
Progressives’ approach to democracy promotion also needs to be more patient. 
Too often, we fall into one of two equal and opposite errors when contemplating 
undemocratic societies. Either we fool ourselves into thinking that a decade or 
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so of carefully tailored aid packages, diplomacy, and technical assistance will 
produce “democracy” in short order (which virtually never happens), or we 
become cynical and despondent when things fail to change on schedule, and 
conclude instead that the society at issue is somehow “not ready” for democracy 
(the powerful will resist it; the powerless don’t want it), so we might as well give 
up and simply accept the repressive status quo.
It’s worth recalling that our own democracy was hardly created overnight. 
American democracy didn’t come about in a decade or two thanks to generous 
aid from foreign benefactors. It didn’t develop as a result of ten years of tech-
nical assistance supplied by well-meaning international bureaucrats or nicely 
packaged loans from the World Bank. 
On the contrary. It was a long hard slog from ancient Athens to the Magna 
Carta, from the English Bill of Rights to the Declaration of Independence, from 
abolitionism to the Nineteenth Amendment. It’s still a long hard slog today, full of 
backsliding. And if it took centuries of struggle to get to the messy and imperfect 
form of democracy we have now, why imagine that other societies can transition 
or transform into democracies overnight? Granted, modern communications 
and transportation technologies have accelerated the pace of cultural change, 
but enduring change is still harder and slower than we like to think. 
The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report offers some cautionary 
numbers: Looking at the time it took the twentieth century’s “fastest reform-
ers” to achieve “basic governance transformations,” the report concludes that 
on average, it took the 20 fastest-performing states 27 years to begin to get a 
serious grip on corruption, 36 years to achieve basic government effectiveness, 
and 41 years to achieve a basic rule-of-law culture. If we care about promoting 
democracy, we need to accept that gradualism isn’t necessarily a cop-out (though 
it can be); much of the time, it’s a simple recognition that rushing democracy 
sometimes ends up undermining it. 
Finally, our approach to democracy promotion abroad needs to be realistic 
with regard to domestic constraints as well. Our own democracy has produced, at 
most, a fickle consensus in favor of democracy promotion. Pragmatically speak-
ing, this has meant that political will has been uneven, and funding inconsistent. 
We may recognize that promoting sustainable democratic societies abroad is 
a long-term and expensive project, but we must also recognize that our own 
democracy has shown little talent or appetite for long-term, expensive projects. 
On one level, everyone knows this; but on another level, our democracy- 
promotion apparatus, and the people who work within it, consistently ignore 
it. We routinely plan programs that we know will require multiyear funding 
to be sustainable, even when we also know perfectly well that such funding is 
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unlikely to materialize. This is counterproductive, and has left many fledgling 
democratic societies strewn with the wreckage of abandoned projects: pris-
ons dependent on electronic security measures that fall apart when foreign 
benefactors stop paying for a steady supply of power; legislative reform efforts 
that produce volumes of complex new commercial codes that no one has the 
money to print and distribute; and so on. These abandoned projects often end 
up wasting time and money, and they leave behind bitterness and cynicism, not 
hope or new capacities.
PRinCiPLes into PRACtiCe
Truly accepting the low likelihood of sustained funding would lead to a very dif-
ferent approach to democracy-promotion projects. We would abandon resource-
intensive projects and focus instead only on those about which we can affirma-
tively answer a very simple question: If this project runs for a year and is then 
abandoned, will it still have done more good than harm? Sometimes—such as 
when a project focuses on providing local personnel with key skills—the answer 
may be yes. Other times, it will be no, and we should cease and desist.
Being unable to do something ourselves doesn’t mean we can’t help others do 
something themselves, of course. Diplomacy, both private and public, remains 
a powerful and relatively low-cost tool for supporting democratic reforms. 
The American private sector can also play a useful role. But we do need a more 
thoughtful and principled approach for deciding when and how we should get 
directly involved in democracy promotion in a particular society, and when we 
should remain in the role of sympathetic bystander.
So how’s Obama doing? The Bush Administration largely made a hash of 
democracy promotion, despite recent revisionist attempts to claim credit for 
the Arab Spring. Has Obama done any better, so far?
On the whole, yes. It took a while—at first, the Administration’s approach to 
democracy promotion could be most generously characterized as mendacious 
avoidance—but by the late spring of 2011 Obama had found his way to a sober, 
principled stance:
It’s not America that put people into the streets of Tunis and Cairo—it was the 
people themselves who launched these movements, and it’s the people themselves 
that must ultimately determine their outcome. Not every country will follow our 
particular form of representative democracy, and there will be times when our 
short-term interests don’t align perfectly with our long-term vision for the region. 
But we can, and we will, speak out for a set of core principles . . . . [We oppose] 
the use of violence and repression . . . [support] a set of universal rights . . . [and] 
support political and economic reform.
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Obama’s May 2011 speech was a good one—an excellent one, in fact—though its 
subtler messages were almost entirely overshadowed by a brief reference to the 
appropriate borders for a Palestinian state. 
Putting our principles into practice will be an enormous challenge—and so 
far, the jury is still out on whether the Obama Administration is truly serious 
about the project. It should be—it can be. But will it be? d
Global outreach: speaking to the Awakening world
Rachel Kleinfeld
 While presidential candidates pick fights over polarity—which countries are gaining power and which are declining—they are missing the most dramatic shift in foreign policy in centuries: the rise of individuals 
within each country vis-à-vis their governments. 
In previous centuries, kings made the foreign policy for their realm, with-
out consulting powerless peasants. True, businesses such as the British East 
India Company conducted some policy, but only after being granted a direct 
charter by the monarchy to act on its behalf. The eighteenth century saw the 
rise of democracy. But citizens could only elect their leaders, not conduct for-
eign policy. Governments still dealt with other governments. For much of the 
twentieth century, an individual could affect foreign policy only by joining the 
government, or maybe by holding one of the very few positions of influence 
that then existed outside government. 
But in the latter half of the century, this model began to break down. Multi-
national businesses, wielding immense resources in otherwise weak countries, 
began to have policy influence. Financial flows resulting from thousands of 
traders’ individual decisions became big enough to influence other nations’ 
currencies and to create economic pressures that affected policy. Groups 
of citizens also started to make their voices heard internationally. Amnesty 
International became an influential global player; the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines won a Nobel Prize as much for its organizational model as 
for its cause. 
The rise of the Internet and social networking has accelerated this fracturing 
of foreign policy. Skype, satellite television, cell phones, and other technologies 
have made citizens of even remote, impoverished parts of the world aware of 
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